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THE NATURE OF THE FINTECH FIRM 
   
Howell E. Jackson*  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The title of this essay is an homage to Ronald Coase’s classic work, The 
Nature of the Firm, in which Professor Coase offered up a pithy but 
profound exposition of the question why some business activities are 
located within the discretionary control of corporate management while 
others are exchanged through arm’s length transactions in the marketplace.1  
As explicated decades later in the press release announcing the award of 
Professor Coase’s Nobel Prize in the Economic Sciences, the Royal 
Swedish Academy of Sciences identified the article’s focus on transaction 
costs for market transactions, as well as production costs for activities 
organized within the firm, as being of “critical importance”: 
  
If these circumstances are taken into account, it may be 
concluded that a firm originates when allocative measures 
are carried out at lower total production, contract and 
administrative costs within the firm than by means of 
purchases and sales on the market. Similarly, a firm 
expands to the point where an additional allocative measure 
 
 
*  James S. Reid, Jr., Professor of Law, Harvard University.  This essay draws on the work of 
and discussions with my students at Harvard Law School.  My thanks to Professor Dirk Andreas 
Zetzsche for helpful comments and suggestions. 
1.  Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 392 (1937).  I am hardly the 
first to make a connection between Professor Coase’s classic article and the impact of technological 
developments on optimal models of productions.  See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux 
and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002) (exploring the potential for peer production in a 
technologically advanced economy).  In a related vein, Luca Enriques & Dirk Zetzsche, Corporate 
Technologies and the Tech Nirvana (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 457/2019, 
2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3392321, has recently engaged in a 
similarly spirited exercise exploring (with some skepticism) the capacity of artificial intelligence and 
other fintech innovations to revolutionize corporate governance. 
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costs more internally than it would through a contract on 
markets. If transaction costs were zero, no firms would 
arise. All allocation would take place through simple 
contracts between individuals.2 
   
For years, Professor Coase’s article has inspired corporate theorists and 
earned a place in the pantheon of corporate law scholarship.  In this essay, 
I return to The Nature of the Firm to explore the fintech revolution and the 
supervisory challenges that aspects of this revolution have posed for 
regulatory authorities.  Several of the examples I discuss concern the 
distinction between activities located within a firm and those arranged 
through market transactions often supplied through new and specialized 
fintech entities. Two others explore the changing nature of what it means to 
exercise managerial discretion in an era of machine learning and artificial 
intelligence. 
 
I. FINANCE AND FINTECH 
 
While other scholars have offered a number of plausible definitions of 
fintech,3 my own preference is to define the phenomenon as encompassing 
 
 
2.  Press Release, Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences (Oct. 15, 1991) (available at 
https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/1991/press-release/). 
3.  See, e.g., Chris Brummer & Yesha Yadav, Fintech and the Innovation Trilemma, 108 GEO. 
L.J. 235, 241 (2019) (“the use of digital technologies in finance”); William Magnuson, Regulating 
Fintech, VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1174 (2018) (“the new breed of companies that specialize in providing 
financial services through technologically enabled mobile and online platforms”);  Rory Van Loo, 
Making Innovation More Competitive: The Case of Fintech, 65 UCLA L. REV. 232, 239 (2018) 
(“Fintech is used here to refer to the relatively new category of companies whose business models are 
based on digital products[, but] leaves out legacy banks . . . which may now offer similar products but 
whose services originally lacked a digital component.”).  In its recent report on fintech and related 
developments, the U.S. Treasury Department did not offer a precise definition but organized its 
discussion of fintech in a manner analogous to my own, embracing both innovations within traditional 
financial firms and the emergence of new technology-based firms. See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, A 
FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY: NONBANK FINANCIALS, FINTECH, AND 
INNOVATION 5 (2018). Professor Dirk Zetsche and his many co-authors have refined the concept of 
fintech to distinguish “regtech,” the emergence of regulatory technologies, and “techfin,” the entrance 
of primarily technology companies (like Google or Apple) into the world of finance.   See, e.g., Dirk A. 
Zetzsche, Douglas W. Arner, Ross P. Buckley & Rolf H. Weber, The Future of Data-Driven Finance 
and Regtech: Lessons from EU Big Bang II (Eur. Banking Inst. Working Paper Series No. 35, 2019), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3359399;  Dirk A. Zetzsche, Ross P. Buckley, Douglas W. Arner & János N. 
Barberis, From FinTech to TechFin: The Regulatory Challenges of Data-Driven Finance, 14 N.Y.U. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol61/iss1/8
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a wide range of private and regulatory innovations that have become 
possible through the rapid decline in the cost of computing, accompanied 
by the widespread availability of reliable, high-speed connectivity (typically 
over the internet), and an explosion of newly collected data about a broad 
swath of personal and commercial characteristics and behaviors. This 
technological transformation has potentially huge implications for the 
domain of finance, which, to paraphrase Professors Merton and Bodie, can 
be helpfully demarked as “the movement of value across time and space 
under conditions of uncertainty that are not fully knowable by other private 
parties or government agents.”4  The critical concept here is “conditions of 
uncertainty,” which includes, among other things, the uncertainty whether 
a borrower will repay his or her loan, the uncertainty whether an insured 
risk (like an earthquake) will come to pass, the uncertainty whether 
providers of liquidity (like repurchase counterparties or market-makers for 
bonds) will withdraw unexpectedly from their markets, or the uncertainty 
whether interest rates will rise or fall as expected.  On many dimensions, 
fintech allows for these and other uncertainties (i.e., risks) to be managed in 
new, more efficient, and more expeditious ways. Moreover, as I explain 
below, fintech innovations allow for the management and oversight of many 
risks and associated operations to be contracted out of regulated entities and 
into new fintech firms or market transactions. Sometimes, fintech 
innovations create the possibility of entirely new kinds of market 
transactions, as is the case with the introduction of new networks such as 
payment platforms or clearing systems.5  That is, the rise of fintech increases 
the set of viable arrangements for producing financial services, potentially 
relocating significant amounts of activities that were previously based 
within the regulated firm and subject to management discretion in a well-
supervised environment.6  Similarly, technological developments also have 
 
 
J.L. & BUS. 393 (2018). See also Douglas W. Arner, János Barberis & Ross P. Buckley, The Evolution 
of FinTech: A New Post-Crisis Paradigm, 47 GEO. J. INT'L L. 1271, 1272 (2015-2016) (defining fintech 
as “the use of technology to deliver financial solutions”). 
4.  ZVI BODIE & ROBERT C. MERTON, FINANCE 2 (2000). 
5.  See Enriques & Zetzsche, supra note 1, at 11-13. 
6.  In The Nature of the Firm, Professor Coase identified technological developments—then, 
telephones and telegraphs—as having the potential for changing the scope of efficient firm size, though 
he interpreted these changes as creating the potential for larger firms rather than the shrinking of 
incumbent firms contemplated in the text.  See Coase, supra note 1, at 397. 
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the potential to improve the ability of government agents to monitor 
financial activity and identify more rapidly emerging risks.  
The erosion of regulated financial firms’ franchise substantially predates 
the rise of the internet or the introduction of distributed ledgers, and actually 
was well underway when Steve Jobs was still working out of his garage.7 
At least as early as the 1970s, the expansion of commercial paper was an 
early example of disintermediation: short-term funding for high-quality 
corporate issuers moved from intermediated bank loans into 
disintermediated commercial paper issuances. The process accelerated in 
the 1990s with the explosion of securitization practices whereby many other 
commercial and consumer loans found funding through capital market 
transactions, and banks and thrifts adopted new originate-to-distribute 
business models. The emergence of marketplace lending in the new 
millennium—and the first illustration in this chronology that might properly 
be labeled “fintech”—allowed yet more kinds of consumer borrowing to be 
disintermediated, and in some cases crowdsourced with retail funding, but 
more commonly now through funding from institutional investors. Moving 
away from credit markets, one can also observe over the past several 
decades how swaps and other derivatives moved interest rate risk, foreign 
exchange risk, credit risk, and even weather risk into the capital markets and 
off the balance sheets of regulated entities. Innovations in information 
processing, including the development of options-pricing models and 
technological developments such as the Bloomberg terminal, as well as the 
work of the now often maligned—but still historically important—rating 
agencies, made these advances in finance possible.  Now, fintech is starting 
to produce similar effects, only more, better, faster and more economical.   
 
II. ENTITIES VERSUS ACTIVITIES  
AND THE CHALLENGE OF FINTECH 
 
A classic—and in many areas still dominant—approach to financial 
regulation is based on the regulation of entities.  If a firm engages in some 
core financial function—like banking, insurance, or the securities 
 
 
7.  The history of the developments discussed in this paragraph are reviewed in MICHAEL S. 
BARR, HOWELL E. JACKSON & MARGARET E. TAHYAR, FINANCIAL REGULATION: LAW AND POLICY 
207-13, 372-74, 457-61 & 1237-68 (2nd ed. 2018) (Foundation Press).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol61/iss1/8
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business—then the firm itself (often along with all affiliated entities) is 
subject to strict regulation, such as activities restrictions and capital 
requirements, as well as supervisory oversight, typically reporting, 
examination, and an enforcement regime.  Once subject to entity-based 
regulation, a financial firm also enjoys certain benefits not available to other 
firms.  For example, certain aspects of the U.S. payments system are 
available only to insured depository institutions.  Similarly, insured 
depositories are the only entities that are permitted to “export” interest rates 
from their home jurisdictions, thereby preempting local usury laws and 
other state-based consumer protections in other jurisdictions.  
Faced with a burdensome and costly system of entity-based regulation, 
the fintech firm has every incentive to organize its behaviors to stay outside 
the relevant regulatory perimeters and simply contract for the provision of 
critical functions, like access to payment systems, through market 
transactions with already-regulated entities. So, for example, when Apple 
wanted to launch Apple Pay, it simply entered into contracts with existing 
banks and credit card providers to use their payment access and monetized 
its payments interface through a share of interchange fees.8 Similarly, when 
marketplace lenders wanted the advantages of relaxed usury rules and 
uniform consumer protection statutes, they negotiated with existing banks 
located in business-friendly jurisdictions through a process known as “rent-
a-charter,” whereby the contracting bank formally originates all loans and 
then transfers them to the marketplace lenders for permanent funding and 
servicing.9  Or, to put it in Coasean terms, as the domain of market-based 
transactions increased with technological developments, fewer activities 
had to be located within the discretionary (and costly) management of the 
regulated firm itself.10  One of the reasons for the low enthusiasm 
 
 
8.  See Brummer & Yadav, supra note 3, at 277 & n.189. 
9.  See Noah Buhayar, Where Peer-to-Peer Loans Are Born, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK 
(Apr. 16, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-16/webbank-where-peer-to-peer-
loans-are-born [https://perma.cc/49LQ-P8G4].  
10.  In his essay, Professor Coase identified government polices as having the potential to 
influence the location of economic activity. His example concerned sales taxes, which applied primarily 
to market transactions and thus encouraged the location of activities to within the firm.  See Coase, supra 
note 1, at 393.  With respect to the examples discussed in the main text, government requirements 
imposed on regulated firms—or example capital requirements or activities restrictions—operate as a tax 
on those firms, thereby encouraging the movement of activities to market transactions with unregulated 
firms.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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surrounding the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency’s (OCC) much 
publicized efforts to develop a new fintech charter that would attract fintech 
firms into the regulated space—aside from legal challenges from entrenched 
interests11—has been the simple fact that fintech firms have many paths to 
gaining access to regulatory benefits without the burdens of direct 
regulation and supervisory control.12 
While new fintech entrants have incentives to tap into the regulated sector 
for the bare minimum of activities, regulated entities also have incentives to 
“push out” new fintech services into unaffiliated firms operating beyond the 
regulatory perimeter.  Such push-out strategies allow for innovations 
outside the constraints of supervisory controls while providing a potentially 
cost-effective mechanism for diversifying revenue streams and customer 
services of regulated entities. Prominent examples would include efforts of 
established firms to provide customer access to crypto-currencies, but 
without assuming full responsibility for custody and other  customer 
protections typically required of broker-dealers.13  The role of several major 
financial firms in supporting Facebook’s Libra initiative for a new stable-
value cryptocurrency (a stablecoin), but locating it in a new legally distinct 
non-U.S. entity, offers another still unfolding illustration of a push-out 
strategy to accommodate fintech innovations beyond traditional regulatory 
perimeters, posing questions (among other things) with respect of the 
 
 
11.  Rachel Witkowski, Google and PayPal Explored OCC’s Fintech Charter, Then Walked 
Away, AM. BANKER (July 19, 2019), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/google-and-paypal-
explored-occs-fintech-charter-then-walked-away [https://perma.cc/LZA9-2R9H]. See also Vullo v. 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 378 F. Supp. 3d 271, 292 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2019) (finding 
that New York state banking regulator had standing to challenge the fintech charter, and that it appeared 
to at least partially exceed OCC’s authority), final judgment entered sub nom. Lacewell v. Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, No. 18-cv-8377 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2019) (permanently enjoining OCC 
from regulating any “fintech applicant[] . . . that do[es] not accept deposits”).  
12.  Lea Nonniger, Tech and Fintech Firms Aren’t Interested in the OCC’s Fintech Charter, 
BUSINESS INSIDER (June 18, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/google-paypal-not-interested-in-
occ-fintech-charter-2019-6 [https://perma.cc/Z8WJ-NERJ].  
13.  For an overview of these issues including a reference to “non-custodial models,” see Div. of 
Trading & Mts., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n & Office of Gen Counsel, Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., Joint 
Staff Statement on Broker-Dealer Custody of Digital Asset Securities (July 8, 2019), SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/joint-staff-statement-broker-dealer-custody-
digital-asset-securities [https://perma.cc/4Q3J-6BHT].  For a more general treatment of the subject, see 
Timothy G. Massad, It’s Time to Strengthen the Regulation of Crypto-Assets, BROOKINGS (Mar. 2019), 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/its-time-to-strengthen-the-regulation-of-crypto-assets/ 
[https://perma.cc/H4Y5-766G]. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol61/iss1/8
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enterprise’s ability to ensure compliance with anti-money laundering 
requirements.14 
 
III. MOUNTING AN EFFECTIVE  
DEFENSE TO REGULATORY PERIMETERS 
 
Drawing an effective line between activities that must be brought within 
the regulatory perimeter for entity regulation and those activities that can 
remain outside of direct supervisory oversight is a fraught task.15 Too bright 
a line invites evasion through complicated contracting terms with licensing 
and profit-sharing arrangements that are difficult to interpret and police.  
Too loose a definition (if backed by the threat of credible enforcement) will 
discourage innovation and add to compliance burdens. Oftentimes, 
innovations will occur and contractual arrangements will be put in place 
before regulatory officials have even focused on the issue, leaving 
regulators in the unenviable position of having to retrieve the horses once 
they are out of the barn and already lent out for hire.16 
To be sure, fintech firms have not always been able to escape the scrutiny 
and oversight of financial regulation. Many fintech innovators in the 
payments space have evaded direct regulation as banks, but must still 
comply with state money transmitter requirements.  The U.S. operations of 
PayPal offer one example of this approach.17  Marketplace lenders that do 
not rely on the rent-a-charter tactic will also generally be subject to state 
consumer lending laws.18  In some instances, regulatory authorities may 
 
 
14.  See Timothy Massad, Is Facebook Libra a Betrayal of Satoshi Nakamoto’s Vision?, 
FORTUNE (July 15, 2019), https://fortune.com/2019/07/15/facebook-libra-coin-cryptocurrency-hearing/ 
[https://perma.cc/FM95-6ER7].  See also Dirk A. Zetzsche, Ross P. Buckley & Douglas W. Arner, 
Regulating LIBRA: The Transformative Potential of Facebook’s Cryptocurrency and Possible 
Regulatory Responses (Eur. Banking Inst Working Paper Series, No. 2019/44, 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3414401. 
15.  For an insightful discussion of the perils of entities-based regulation for policing systemic 
risk, see Jeremy C. Kress, Patricia A. McCoy & Daniel Schwarcz, Regulating Entities and Activities: 
Complementary Approaches to Nonbank Systemic Risk, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019). 
16.  For an insightful characterization of these problems as an irreconcilable trilemma, see 
Bummer & Yadav, supra note 3. 
17.  See Van Loo, supra note 3, at 239. 
18.  For an overview of the overlapping system of federal and state oversight of marketplace 
lending, see DAVID W. PERKINS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44614, MARKETPLACE LENDING: FINTECH 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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attempt to gain control over fintech firm activities as a result of their 
contractual relationships with regulated firms.19  As the regulated entities 
must be attentive to supervisory concerns, there are a variety of ways in 
which public officials can leverage that influence into indirect control over 
fintech entrepreneurs.20 For example, recent efforts to define the ways in 
which regulated securities firms can maintain custody arrangements for 
cryptocurrencies can be seen as an effort on the part of government actors 
to establish some degree of supervisory oversight of cryptocurrencies 
beyond their direct control.21 
In addition, if the manipulation of regulatory perimeters becomes too 
blatant, the legal system has ways of counteracting innovations that appear 
egregious. Several courts, for example, have disregarded interest-rate terms 
set through rent-a-charter arrangements when the practices seemed 
especially abusive.22 Similarly, the Federal Reserve Board has been 
reluctant to admit into the payment system a new bank charter whose entire 
business plan was based on giving unregulated third parties the functional 
equivalent of access to interest bearing accounts at Federal Reserve Banks.23 
So, there are limits on the extent to which fintech firms can contract into 
 
 
IN CONSUMER AND SMALL-BUSINESS LENDING 12-22 (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44614.pdf 
[perma.cc/AJC8-6YFS]. 
19.  For example, the Bank Service Corporation Act has been interpreted to provide federal 
agencies the authority to obtain information with respect to, and in some instances actually examine, 
fintech firms providing important services to regulated entities.  See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., FIL-19-
2019, Financial Institution Letter on Technology Service Provider Contracts (Apr. 2, 2019), 
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2019/fil19019.pdf [perma.cc/NWD9-K6BR]. 
20.  See BARR, JACKSON & TAHYAR, supra note 6, at 216-21 (exploring other instances in which 
regulatory officials used supervisory authority to constrain the activities of regulated firms).  
21.  See sources cited supra note 13.  See also Inv. Co. Inst. & Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, 
SEC Interpretive Letter (Jan. 18, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/noaction/2018/cryptocurrency-011818.htm. 
[https://perma.cc/L7ML-VE3V] (exploring custody and other regulatory aspects of cryptocurrency 
holdings in investment funds).  
22.  For a critical overview of the principal legal cases setting aside efforts of lenders to contract 
out of usury limits, see DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, FEDERAL BANKING REGULATORS CAN AND 
SHOULD RESOLVE MADDEN AND TRUE LENDER DEVELOPMENTS (Aug. 14, 2018), 
https://www.davispolk.com/files/madden-true-lender-federal-regulatory-fix-whitepaper_final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6FRC-AGQJ].  
23.  See Carolyn Duren & Rucha Khole, ‘Narrow Bank’ Challenges Traditional Industry Model, 
But Fed Pushes Back, S&P GLOBAL MKT. INTELLIGENCE (Mar. 27, 2019), 
https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/49204495 
[https://perma.cc/JYQ6-K2EN]. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol61/iss1/8
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key financial functions.  But with a very large number of existing banks and 
other kinds of financial firms available to provide a port of entry, there are 
ample opportunities for fintech firms with a new way of managing 
uncertainty or accessing customers to find a regulated entity willing to 
partner up for a modest fee.24 
Sometimes, regulators have a hard time even realizing that a regulatory 
perimeter has been breached.  Here, the rise of robo-advisers offers an object 
lesson.25  Robo-advisers are typically organized as broker-dealers and 
investment advisers under the supervision of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), Financial Industry Regulator Authority (FINRA), and 
in certain respects state securities officials.  Robo-advisers use investment 
algorithms to invest client assets in regulated mutual funds, including 
exchange-traded funds (ETFs), based on a limited number of characteristics, 
such as risk-return preference, investment period, and tax status.  Robo-
advisers are subject to regulation, but a relatively lax form that consists 
primarily of open-ended fiduciary duties and soft disclosure standards. The 
product that robo-advisers offer, however, is functionally quite similar to 
“fund-of-funds” mutual funds, which are subject to much more stringent 
regulatory requirements, including independent board oversight, well-
defined disclosure rules about performance and fees, plus stringent portfolio 
restrictions.  Robo-advisers replicate mutual fund activities through a 
combination of algorithmic models and client agreements.  While they 
contract into the mutual fund industry for their underlying investments, their 
outer wrappers (and associated fee arrangements and disclosure 
requirements) are substantially different than those imposed on functionally 
similar fund-of-fund mutual funds. To date, robo-advisors arguably 
constitute a successful illustration of regulatory arbitrage. 
 
 
 
 
 
24.  Cf. Jeremy Kidd, Fintech Antidote for Rent-Seeking?, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 165 (2018) 
(envisioning the rise of fintech firms as having the potential for reducing rent-seeking in the financial 
service industry). 
25.  The points made in this paragraph are elaborated upon in Howell E. Jackson, Limits of 
Fiduciary Protections for Investors in Mutual Funds and Other Collective Investment Vehicles, in 
FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS IN BUSINESS (Arthur Laby & Jacob H. Russell, eds., Cambridge Univ. Press, 
forthcoming 2020) (on file with the author). 
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IV. EXPLOITING THE POTENTIAL  
OF FINTECH FOR PUBLIC PURPOSES 
 
While it is easy—and perhaps natural for a law professor—to focus on 
the extent to which fintech innovations pose challenges to regulatory 
regimes, fintech and its ability to reduce transaction costs and expand the 
range of contractual options also can offer possibilities to promote the 
public interest.  I offer here a brief account of two examples: one ongoing 
and one hypothetical. 
 
A. Emergency Savings in the Workplace 
 
One of the greatest sources of financial vulnerability for low- and 
moderate-income individuals is the absence of emergency savings.  To 
invoke an oft-quoted statistic, some nearly forty  percent of Americans do 
not have immediate access to four hundred dollars of funds in the event of 
an emergency need.26 Much regulatory effort has gone into policing abusive 
short-term lending practices, like some payday lending programs, to address 
a consequence of the absence of meaningful emergency savings, but another 
more direct solution would be to increase emergency savings balances. A 
good place to start such an effort is with major employers with large 
numbers of low- and moderate-income employees.27  For the most part, 
these employers are not financial institutions and, while they may offer 
various kinds of fringe benefits (like health care and retirement savings 
plans), emergency savings is not yet typically on the menu of most 
employee benefit plans.  There are, however, a number of fintech firms that 
provide a range of linkages between employer payrolls and regulated 
emergency savings vehicles. One could easily imagine a combination of 
 
 
26.  See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC WELL-
BEING OF U.S. HOUSEHOLDS IN 2018 21-22 (May 2019), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2018-report-economic-well-being-us-households-
201905.pdf, [https://perma.cc/829Y-LFPU].  
27.  The concepts presented in this paragraph are illustrated by a recent initiative, funded by 
BlackRock, to promote emergency savings.  See BLACKROCK’S EMERGENCY SAVINGS INITIATIVE, 
https://savingsproject.org/ [https://perma.cc/R2PZ-A96K].  The role of fintech firms in the 
implementation of this strategy is the subject of a forthcoming Harvard Law School case study. Adam 
Spiegel & Howell Jackson, Employee Benefits – Emergency Savings Account (draft of November 2019) 
(on file with author; to be published at https://casestudies.law.harvard.edu/howell-e-jackson/). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol61/iss1/8
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nonprofit leadership with limited government support to promote fintech 
linkages and employer nudges to steer workers into emergency savings 
programs.  Here, fintech firms might exploit technological innovations to 
accumulate funds in a manner that has proven unprofitable and therefore 
unattractive to regulated firms operating on their own.  
 
B. Safe, Low-Cost Accounts for the Unbanked 
 
Finding safe and cost-effective savings vehicles for other unbanked 
individuals poses a related problem that may also allow a fintech solution.  
Many kinds of depository institutions operating in the United States today 
have historical roots in efforts to promote savings among working 
Americans: savings banks, thrifts, and credit unions all share these common 
roots.  And recent efforts to revive a U.S. Postal Bank also are rooted, at 
least in part, on the view that such a bank would provide increased access 
to savings for the presently unbanked.28  But all of these approaches are 
entity-centric and focus on the creation of a well-motived legal entity to 
issue deposits to underserved communities and reinvest those assets through 
the entity’s own balance sheet. 
However, it is entirely possible to create safe savings without the balance 
sheet of a new legal entity.29  The U.S. Treasury issues trillions of dollars of 
safe assets each year.  Even putting aside the large volumes held on the 
Federal Reserve’s balance sheet, there are ample Treasuries available for 
public purchase in a variety of maturities.  There is even an internet portal—
Treasury Direct—where the general public can purchase Treasuries 
directly, albeit with an interface that is currently quite clunky.30  One could 
 
 
28.  See MEHRSA BARADARAN, HOW THE OTHER HALF BANKS: EXCLUSION, EXPLOITATION, 
AND THE THREAT TO DEMOCRACY 183-225 (Harvard Univ. Press 2015); see also Mehrsa Baradaran, 
It’s Time for Postal Banking, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 165 (2014); Mehrsa Baradaran, How the Poor Got 
Cut out of Banking, 62 EMORY L.J. 483 (2013).     
29.  See Commonwealth, Increasing Access to U.S. Savings Bonds: Recommendations for Bond 
Innovations (Dec. 9, 2016). The legal issues summarized in this paragraph are presented more fully in a 
Memorandum from Kathleen Shelton, Harvard Law Sch. Class of 2018, to Howell Jackson (Mar. 16, 
2017) (on file with author).  The adaptation of the Treasury Direct Program in this manner is functionally 
similar to The Narrow Bank approach discussed above, see supra text accompanying note 23, albeit 
targeted at low- and moderate-income individuals in need of a safe saving vehicle rather than the 
wholesale institutional market.   
30.  See Guided Tour, TREASURYDIRECT, 
https://www.treasurydirect.gov/indiv/TDTour/default.htm [https://perma.cc/K4W3-CRAD]. 
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easily imagine, however, a refreshed Treasury Direct portal, supported 
through open-access APIs that would allow fintech firms to market safe 
savings products to a range of consumers.  The Treasury Department 
already has statutory authority to adjust the terms of Treasury securities to 
accommodate such a program. And, to appease industry resistance, the size 
of permissible balances could be set at a level to avoid competition with 
private firms, just as the Obama Administration did with its now terminated 
myRA program.31  The product would solely be targeted at customers with 
account balances beneath commercially viable levels.  Fintech 
entrepreneurs would provide all of the necessarily linkages, including 
(perhaps) offloading programs to private banks when Treasury accounts 
reach high enough balances. 
 
V. ON DISCRETION & INTENTIONALITY 
 
In The Nature of the Firm, Professor Coase identified managerial 
discretion as a critical strength of the firm and a principal justification for 
moving activities away from market transactions and into firm control.  But 
fintech and most especially the emergence of artificial intelligence based on 
machine learning offer new ways of organizing activities within the firm but 
outside the control of managerial discretion, at least as the concept has 
traditionally been understood. This phenomenon has many important 
implications—among other things, for personal privacy and intellectual 
property32—but the one that I want to explore here concerns state-of-mind 
requirements in various legal regimes.  In many contexts, legal liability 
turns on the state of mind of a legal actor, requiring in some cases a showing 
of negligence and in others a finding of intentionality. Much of the first-
year law school curriculum and a fair bit of jurisprudence explores the 
justifications for different state of mind requirements, but—put crudely—
 
 
31.  See Richard Eisenberg, R.I.P. myRA Retirement Account, Gone Too Soon, Forbes (July 28, 
2017),  https://www.forbes.com/sites/nextavenue/2017/07/28/r-i-p-myra-retirement-account-gone-too-
soon/#73c1db0a7885 [https://perma.cc/KB5G-DP6Y].  
32.  For an overview of the issues with an emphasis on financial stability, see FINANCIAL 
STABILITY BOARD, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND MACHINE LEARNING IN FINANCIAL SERVICES: 
MARKET DEVELOPMENTS AND FINANCIAL STABILITY IMPLICATIONS (2017).  See also William 
Magnuson, Artificial Financial Intelligence, HARV. BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3403712). 
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the law tends to impose intentionality requirements when the social 
desirability of some activity is ambiguous and doctrine has evolved to limit 
liability to those cases where the likelihood of social harm is greatest and 
the culpability of the defendant clearest.  With artificial intelligence, 
however, firms now have the opportunity to move activities away from the 
kinds of discretionary management that can give rise to a finding of human 
intentionality and into the domain of machine learning, where the concept 
of intentionality becomes opaque if not evanescent.33  
 
A. Market Manipulation and High-Frequency Trading 
 
A good example of this phenomenon can be seen in the area of market 
manipulation and high-frequency trading (HFT). One potential concern 
with high-frequency trading is that its trading practices are often reminiscent 
of traditional forms of manipulation.34 For example, HFT strategies often 
entail the posting of large numbers of trade orders, the vast majority of 
which are withdrawn before execution. This practice could be seen as 
analogous to fictitious trading proscribed under traditional market 
manipulation doctrine. Another example would be trading strategies in 
which HFT firms detect the presence of large “buy” orders—typically from 
institutional investors—and then seek to place orders ahead of the 
institutional buyer, pushing prices away from the large purchaser and 
allowing the HFT trader to earn quick profits by placing itself between the 
orders in the marketplace. In certain respects, this practice is analogous to 
front-running.35 
A robust and insightful body of academic literature and policy papers 
have recently explored the question as to how traditional anti-manipulation 
rules should be applied to these new concepts. One component of this 
literature is an examination of how intentionality—traditionally a key 
 
 
33.  But cf. Enriques & Zetzsche, supra note 1 (emphasizing the challenges in delegating 
discretion to algorithms in the contest of corporate governance). 
34.  For a good overview of the differences between old manipulation practices and new 
manipulation practices, see Tom C.W. Lin, The New Market Manipulation, 66 EMORY L.J. 1253, 1280-
94 (2017).  
35.  See Alan Chan, Do High Frequency Traders Front-Run the Market by Using Their Speed 
Advantage?, FORBES (Apr. 3, 2014, 1:41 P.M.), https://www.forbes.com/sites/quora/2014/04/03/do-
high-frequency-traders-front-run-the-market-by-using-their-speed-advantage/#4c0442fb25a0 
[https://perma.cc/548V-CD62]. 
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element of manipulation cases—should be applied in these concepts where 
human intentionality is not directly at issue in the trading, but arguably 
something akin to intentionality might be found in the design of the code 
that supports the trade.36 Of course, to the extent the HFT trading algorithms 
have their own elements of machine learning, it is quite easy to imagine the 
algorithms themselves developing trading practices wholly unanticipated by 
the humans that generated the underlying code in the first place. 
 
B. Artificial Intelligence and the Enforcement of Fair Lending Rules 
 
Another example of this phenomenon occurs in the area of 
antidiscrimination law defining the boundaries of fair lending practices. 
Traditionally, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) and related 
antidiscrimination laws prohibit discrimination in lending through a 
doctrinal structure that includes a combination of disparate treatment and 
disparate impact analysis.37 The doctrines that evolved in this area look to 
whether a lending firm intentionally discriminated on the basis of protected 
characteristics (such as race), or made use of factors that had a disparate 
impact on protected groups without there being a legitimate business 
justification for the lender’s underwriting practices. Cases arising under 
these provisions often turn on the state of mind of the lender for both 
intentional use of race and business justifications for the use of other 
factors.38  
Increasingly, lenders today, and most particularly many fintech lenders, 
rely on algorithms and machine learning to make credit decisions. In this 
context as well, the use of algorithms does  not easily map on to traditional 
 
 
36.  For an overview of sources on this topic, see Lin, supra note 34, at 1300-03.  See also id. at 
1303-06 (advocating intermediary integrity obligations as an alternative approach); Merritt B. Fox & 
Kevin S. Haeberle, Evaluating Stock-Trading Practices and Their Regulation, 42 J. CORP. L. 887 
(2017) (advocating that legal doctrine focus on the second market impact of trading practices).  For a 
more general, but still quite helpful, proposal for the analysis of manipulation, see Merritt B. Fox, 
Lawrence R. Glosten & Gabriel V. Rauterberg, Stock Market Manipulation and its Regulation, 35 YALE 
J. ON REG. 67 (2018).   
37.  See Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (2018). 
38.  See, e.g., Anderson v. Wachovia Mortg. Corp., 621 F.3d 261, 269-79 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(performing detailed analysis of alleged intentional discrimination and business justifications); Golden 
v. City of Columbus, 404 F.3d 950, 963-65 (6th Cir. 2005) (affirming dismissal of ECOA disparate-
impact claim regarding utility fees, in part relying on legitimate business justification that measuring 
unit-by-unit consumption was impracticable). 
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doctrinal test of intentionality and, as my colleague Talia Gillis has explored 
in several recent articles, advanced machine learning techniques seek to find 
variables correlated with creditworthiness and profitability, acting without 
the intervention of any human state of mind or discretionary authority to 
make pricing or credit allocation decisions.39 One of the great debates of 
consumer financial regulation today is how to align these new lending 
practices with traditional fair lending doctrine.  
To put these two examples into the Coasean framework, underwriting 
decisions and trading strategies were typically organized within the 
operations of a regulated firm because of the advantages of delegating to 
expert personnel the discretion to decide to whom to make loans or by which 
trading strategies to execute transactions. While lending algorithms and 
HFT strategies may formally remain within the regulated firm, the 
discretionary component and also the possibility of ascertaining human 
intentionality have disappeared. Traditional legal doctrines are incapable of 
providing relief unless regulatory officials devise new approaches to 
enforcement and detection. Efforts of these sorts are underway, but for the 
purposes of this essay the need for such refinement legal doctrines is further 
evidence that fintech innovations are challenging the boundaries of 
regulated firm behavior. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The boundaries of the firm are constantly in flux, and the rise of fintech 
innovation only adds to the pace of change.  Unregulated fintech firms can 
tap into the regulatory perimeter to gain access to essential regulated 
services, and regulated firms can push out to fintech entrepreneurs activities 
that may generate regulatory concerns or compliance costs.  And fintech 
products can transform the ways in which managerial discretion is 
exercised, further complicating the detection and prosecution of violations 
of financial laws. Many of these developments likely have considerable 
benefits for society through improved efficiencies and more effective 
detecting and spreading of financial risks.  But if regulatory officials remain 
 
 
39.  See Talia Gillis, False Dreams of Algorithmic Fairness: The Case of Credit Pricing 
(Working Draft of Sept. 26, 2019) (available at https://scholar.harvard.edu/gillis/job-talk-paper); see 
also Talia B. Gillis & Jann L. Spiess, Big Data and Discrimination, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 459 (2019). 
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flat-footed, these developments can cause breaches in the regulatory 
perimeter and under-enforcement of financial laws and considerable social 
harms.  It is the nature of the fintech firm to disrupt past regulatory 
paradigms and practices. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol61/iss1/8
